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HABEAS CORPUS
When Must a Capital Jury Be Told
That the Defendant Will Be Ineligible
for Parole If Sentenced to Life?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 377-380. © 2000 American Bar Association.
Editor's Note: The respondent's brief
in this case was not available by
PREVIEWs deadline.
ISSUE
When adjudicating a claim that a
defendant in a death penalty case
has a constitutional right to inform
the jurors that if they spare his life,
state law forbids him from ever
being released from prison, is a fed-
eral habeas court bound by the state
court's characterization of state law
for federal constitutional purposes?
FACTS
In September 1992, Bobby Lee
Ramdass and four other men
entered a 7-Eleven store in Fairfax
County, Va. The customers were
ordered to lie on the floor and not
look at them. Three of the men took
the customers' wallets, money from
the cash register, and cigarettes and
lottery tickets from the store's
stock. Mohammed Kayani knelt
down next to the safe and unsuc-
cessfully tried to open it. Ramdass
squatted next to Kayani and yelled
at him to open the safe "or I'll blow
your fucking head off." Ramdass
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then shot Kayani in the head, killing
him for taking too long to open the
safe. While dividing up the robbery
proceeds, Ramdass told one of the
men, "Don't tell anybody about this
[or] I'll kill you and I'll kill your
whole family." A Virginia jury found
Ramdass guilty of capital murder in
the commission of armed robbery.
At the sentencing phase of the trial,
the Commonwealth of Virginia
sought the death penalty, arguing
that Ramdass presented a continu-
ous threat to society. In support of
this argument, the Commonwealth
presented evidence of Ramdass' his-
tory of theft-related crimes that
began at age 14 and his pattern of
recidivism during periods of escape
or probation. The prosecution
detailed how, within three months
of his mandatory parole after serv-
ing four years of a seven-year sen-
tence for robbery, Ramdass commit-
ted a series of at least six armed
robberies. Ramdass' attorney
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responded to the prosecution's argu-
ment by asserting that "Ramdass
will never be out of jail. Your sen-
tence today will insure that if he
lives to be one hundred and twenty-
two, he will spend the rest of his life
in prison."
During the sentencing deliberations,
the jury asked the judge: "If the
Defendant is given life, is there a
possibility of parole at some time
before his natural death?" Over
defense counsel's objection, the trial
judge told the jurors that they
"should impose such punishment as
[they] feel is just under the evi-
dence and within the instructions of
the Court" and they "are not to
concern [them]selves with what
may happen afterwards." The jury
returned a verdict recommending
death on the capital murder count
based upon Ramdass' "future dan-
gerousness" and recommending four
years' imprisonment on the firearm
count.
At the sentencing hearing, Ramdass'
attorney urged the court to impose
a sentence of life in prison instead
of death in light of Ramdass' ineligi-
bility for parole under Virginia's
three-strikes provision. Ramdass'
parole eligibility at the time of the
sentencing hearing was governed by
Virginia's three-strikes statute,
which provides that an individual is
ineligible for parole if he has been
convicted of three separate felony
offenses of murder, rape, or armed
robbery, which were not part of a
common act, transaction, or
scheme. Va.Code Ann. § 53.1-
151(B1).
At the time the jury was deliberat-
ing on Ramdass' case, he had
already been sentenced to 76 years'
imprisonment in connection with
the robbery of a Pizza Hut. In addi-
tion, about three weeks earlier, on
Jan. 7, 1993, a jury had returned a
verdict finding Ramdass guilty in
the armed robbery of a Domino's
Pizza for which it recommended an
18-year sentence. The court, howev-
er, had not yet entered judgment
in that case. It did so nearly
three weeks after the jury in
this case concluded its sentencing
deliberations.
Ramdass' attorney informed the
court that three jurors had told him
they would have imposed a life sen-
tence rather than death if they had
known that Ramdass would not be
eligible for parole. Rejecting
Ramdass' arguments, the trial court
sentenced Ramdass to death.
Ramdass appealed to the Virginia
Supreme Court, arguing that his
death sentence violated the Sixth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution because the trial judge
prevented him from telling the jury
that he was parole ineligible, a
potentially mitigating factor.
Rejecting his argument, the Virginia
Supreme Court stated that Ramdass
had advanced no persuasive reason
to modify prior Virginia precedent
holding that "a jury should not hear
evidence of parole eligibility or inel-
igibility because it is not a relevant
consideration in fixing the appropri-
ate sentence." Ramdass v.
Commonwealth (Ramdass I), 246
Va. 413, 437 S.E.2d 566, 573
(1993).
While Ramdass' request for review
was pending before the United
States Supreme Court, the Court
decided Simmons v. South
Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994),
holding that when a prosecutor
argues future dangerousness to a
capital sentencing jury, a defendant
who is parole ineligible has a due
process right to respond to that
argument by informing the jury,
through argument or instruction, of
his ineligibility for parole. After
deciding Simmons, the U.S.
Supreme Court granted Ramdass'
petition for certiorari and remanded
the case to the Virginia Supreme
Court for reconsideration in light of
Simmons.
On remand, Ramdass argued that
because he was ineligible for parole
under Virginia's three-strikes
statute, Simmons applied to his
case and required that he be
allowed to meet the state's case
against him by informing the jury of
his parole ineligibility. The Virginia
Supreme Court nevertheless reaf-
firmed Ramdass' death sentence,
concluding that the holding in
Simmons was not applicable to this
case. The Virginia court explained
that Simmons applies only if
Ramdass was ineligible for parole
when the jury was considering his
sentence. The Virginia Supreme
Court determined that Ramdass had
not been ineligible for parole at that
time, since he had only two sepa-
rate felony offenses within the
meaning of the three-strikes provi-
sion. Ramdass v. Commonwealth
(Ramdass II), 248 Va. 518, 450
S.E.2d 360, 361 (1994).
Although it recognized the Pizza
Hut conviction and the Kayani mur-
der conviction as predicate offenses
under the three-strikes statute, the
court rejected Ramdass' argument
that the Jan. 7, 1993, jury verdict of
guilty in the Domino's Pizza robbery
was also a predicate conviction,
because judgment had not yet been
entered on that verdict.
Accordingly, the court ruled the
Domino's Pizza conviction could not
be considered as a conviction under
the three-strikes statute.
Ramdass asserted in a state habeas
corpus petition that Simmons
required that the jury be accurately
informed as to his parole eligibility
status. However, Ramdass did not
specifically challenge the Virginia
Supreme Court's determination in
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Ramdass II that under Virginia law,
he was not ineligible for parole.
Ramdass also claimed that his trial
counsel was constitutionally ineffec-
tive for failing to investigate and
object to the appointment of his
mental health expert because that
doctor was "notoriously pro-prose-
cution" and refused to work with
the defense.
The Virginia Supreme Court dis-
missed the state habeas petition,
ruling that Ramdass' Simmons
claim was barred from review by
Hawks v. Cox, 211 Va. 91, 175
S.E.2d 271 (1970) (an issue previ-
ously decided against the petitioner
on direct appeal may not again be
considered on post-conviction
review).
Ramdass then sought habeas relief
in the federal courts. He filed a peti-
tion in February 1997 alleging,
among other things, unconstitution-
al error in the trial court's failure to
allow the jury to consider his
alleged parole ineligibility. The U.S.
District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia granted Ramdass
a writ of habeas corpus based on the
Simmons claim and ordered the
state to resentence Ramdass.
Ramdass v. Angelone, 28 F.Supp.2d
343 (E.D.Va. 1998). The
Commonwealth of Virginia
appealed.
On appeal, the Commonwealth of
Virginia argued (1) that the
Simmons claim was defaulted
because it was not properly raised
in state court, and (2) that Ramdass
is not entitled to relief under
Simmons because, had he been sen-
tenced to life imprisonment, he
would not have been parole ineligi-
ble under Virginia law. Reversing
the district court, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that the question of whether
Ramdass was parole ineligible and
thus entitled to inform the jury of
that status was a question of state
law. The court concluded that the
state court's legal determination
that Ramdass was eligible for parole
was not reviewable by federal
habeas corpus. Ramdass v.
Angelone, 187 F.3d 396 (4th Cir.
1999). The U.S. Supreme Court
thereafter granted Ramdass' petition
for a writ of certiorari.
CASE ANALYSIS
The writ of habeas corpus provides
a means by which the legal authori-
ty under which a person is detained
can be challenged. A writ of habeas
corpus may be used to re-examine
federal constitutional issues even
after trial and review by the state
courts. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443 (1953). By means of a writ of
habeas corpus, a federal court may
order the discharge of any person
held by a state in violation of the
federal Constitution or laws. See 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
In Simmons v. South Carolina, 512
U.S. 154 (1994), the Supreme Court
held that, when a prosecutor argues
future dangerousness to a capital
sentencing jury, a defendant who is
parole ineligible has a due process
right to respond to that argument by
informing the jury, through argu-
ment or instruction, of his ineligibil-
ity for parole. In Simmons, the
prosecutor had argued to the jury
during the penalty phase of trial
that the death sentence was appro-
priate because Simmons, who had
assaulted and killed several elderly
women, was a danger to society. To
rebut this argument, Simmons con-
tended that because he was only a
threat to elderly women, none of
whom he would ever encounter in
prison, he did not pose such a dan-
ger. Simmons proffered evidence
that he was legally ineligible for
parole and requested an instruction
to the jury that if sentenced to life
imprisonment, he would remain
imprisoned for the rest of his natur-
al life. The trial court denied
Simmons' request to inform the jury
of his parole ineligibility.
The Supreme Court ruled that this
denied Simmons due process, hold-
ing that where the State puts the
defendant's future dangerousness in
issue, and the only available alterna-
tive sentence to death is life impris-
onment without possibility of
parole, due process entitles the
defendant to inform the capital sen-
tencing jury-by either argument or
instruction-that he is parole ineli-
gible.
It is undisputed that the prosecu-
tion in Ramdass' case argued that
the death penalty was necessary
solely because Ramdass was a future
danger to society. Whether Ramdass
met the second requirement-that
the only alternative sentence to
death in his case was life imprison-
ment without the possibility of
parole-is the principal source of
dispute in this case. In Ramdass II,
the Virginia Supreme Court deter-
mined that Ramdass was not ineligi-
ble for parole under Virginia law.
Although a jury had returned a ver-
dict finding Ramdass guilty of armed
robbery in the Domino's Pizza case,
the Virginia Supreme Court held
that conviction does not occur until
judgment is entered. It concluded
that the Domino's Pizza robbery
could not be counted as the third
strike because the court had not
entered judgment on that guilty ver-
dict at the time the jury in the pre-
sent case was deliberating Ramdass'
sentence.
Ramdass argues that the Virginia
Supreme Court misconstrued
Simmons as requiring a state law
determination of parole ineligibility
rather than "the functional and
common-sense [im]possibility of
parole" as the trigger for the right to
inform the jury of parole ineligibili-
(Continued on Page 380)
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ty. It is Ramdass' position that ques-
tions concerning the nature or dura-
tion of restraints on liberty require
a functional, rather than a techni-
cal, mode of analysis. He says that
federal questions require a mode of
analysis that looks to the operating
consequences of relevant state law
rather than to the state's characteri-
zation of that law. Ramdass asserts
that however the Virginia Supreme
Court may characterize the circum-
stances that result in parole "ineligi-
bility" under state law, he was cer-
tain never to have an opportunity to
be paroled and therefore was enti-
tled to so inform the jury under
Simmons.
Moreover, even if state law governs
the parole ineligibility determina-
tion for purposes of applying
Simmons, Ramdass accuses the
Virginia Supreme Court of attempt-
ing to avoid the application of
Simmons by adopting a novel and
highly technical definition of con-
victed in the three-strikes provision.
Even if a conviction requires the
entry of judgment, Ramdass main-
tains, the Domino's Pizza guilty ver-
dict still should count as a convic-
tion because the entry of judgment
was nondiscretionary, purely minis-
terial, and legally insignificant.
Ramdass claims that the Supreme
Court in Simmons looked at the
consequences of state law rather
than the State's characterization. He
says that Ramdass' case is indistin-
guishable from Simmons on both
the facts and the law.
The Commonwealth of Virginia,
however, argues that Simmons
grants capital defendants a due
process right in state trials to advise
a jury of parole ineligibility only
when the sole alternative to a sen-
tence of death is a sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibili-
ty of parole. According to the
Commonwealth, that condition can-
not be a general question of practi-
cality determined by a federal
habeas court. The Commonwealth
asserts that parole eligibility is a
state law question.
SIGNIFICANCE
Simmons was decided by a divided
Supreme Court. Justice Blackmun
wrote for the plurality. Justice
Souter filed a concurring opinion in
which Justice Stevens joined.
Justice Ginsburg filed a concurring
opinion. Justice O'Connor wrote an
opinion concurring in the judgment
in which Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Kennedy joined. Justice
Scalia filed a dissenting opinion in
which Justice Thomas joined.
This case gives the Supreme Court
an opportunity to re-examine its
decision in Simmons. Given
changes in the makeup of the Court
since Simmons was decided (Justice
Blackmun has left the Court and
Justice Breyer has joined it), it will
be interesting to see whether the
Court expands or limits the holding
in Simmons. This case also provides
the Supreme Court an opportunity
to examine the role of state courts
in determining state law when
important federal constitutional
issues are at stake.
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